Ancient Epistemology in Visual Studio .NET Printer Denso QR Bar Code in Visual Studio .NET Ancient Epistemology

Ancient Epistemology Using Barcode creator for Visual Studio .NET Control to generate, create QR Code ISO/IEC18004 image in Visual Studio .NET applications. barcode ean8 in order: Catego VS .NET QR Code ries, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topics and Sophistical Refutations. The overall task of these works is to provide an account of the structure of the knowable such that we can understand how knowledge is acquired.

Very briefly that structure is as follows. The fundamental items of nature are substances (ousiai), for example, this man or this horse. These substances, of course, have parts, which are themselves capable of scientific investigation both as parts of substances and in their own right as elements of nature.

Individual substances have so-called accidental attributes. An accidental attribute is, roughly, that which a substance could lose or gain and still be the identical substance. That accidental attributes are gained or lost indicates that they are particular, always located in a completely specifiable space/time framework, e.

g., this shape now or this spatial location now . In addition to the accidental attributes that substances possess, they also have essential attributes.

These are attributes that substances could not lose and continue to be the identical substances they are. The essential attributes of a substance are, basically, those attributes which fix substances within species and genera. Thus, Socrates is essentially a human being, though his height and weight are accidental attributes.

The accidental attributes of a substance themselves are instances of their own species and genera. Thus, this particular colour is an instance of a general colour that is itself an instance of colour. So, in a sense, the species and genera of particular accidental attributes do also belong to the substances to which the accidental attributes belong, that is, they belong to them indirectly.

A further crucial feature of this structure is that individual substances are actualisations of the species to which they belong as the species are actualisations of the genera. So, this man here is an actualisation or realisation of what humanity itself is; he is one realisation of humanity, which is itself one realisation of animality. Further, the accidental attributes of an individual substance are themselves actualisations of that substance.

Socrates actualises himself in his accidental attributes. His identity is realised in his particular accidental attributes that are, of course, being continuously lost and gained. Thus, paradoxically, there is a lot more to Socrates than what he is actually now; a lot of what Socrates is is gone and a lot of what he is is not yet .

One who aims to possess knowledge of the things that exist by nature aims to cognise the relation between the species and genera of particular accidental attributes and the species and genera of individual substances.4. At Post. An. 1.

2 .71b9 12, Aristotle says that we know unqualifiedly when we think we have cognised the cause owing to which the thing is, as the cause of it, and that it cannot be otherwise. This is a.

Aristotle She aims to unde rstand why substances of this sort have the kinds of accidental attributes they have. The particular accidental attributes are actualisations of their species and genera which are themselves knowable as belonging necessarily to the species and genera of substances. The knowledge will be of the relation between, say, a species and its commensurately universal properties, those properties that belong necessarily to a species as such.

A property is an attribute that all and only members of a species possess. A commensurately universal property is one that belongs to the species owing to what the species is, not owing to what the genus is to which the species belongs. This qualification is crucial.

For example, if we aimed to know why human beings are mortal, we must not suppose that mortality is a commensurately universal property of humanity; in fact, it is a commensurately universal property of animality. Human beings are, indeed, mortal, but it is owing to the fact that humanity is a species of animal and mortality belongs to animality that this is so, not to the fact that mortality attaches to humanity as such. Suppose we are trying to make sense of the data regarding rat behaviour in a laboratory.

Our goal is to understand what it is about rats that yields these data. If the questions we are asking are indeed about rats and not, say, about rodents in general or even about animals, success consists in our knowing why these data have occurred. That knowing is of the commensurately universal properties of this species of animal.

To understand why a property belongs to a species is, for Aristotle, to have knowledge of a middle term . The middle term is what supposedly links the species and the properties such that we can see that they must be connected because the species is connected to the middle term and the middle term is connected to the property. The middle term explains, which is to say in Aristotelian jargon, that it is a cause.

Different sorts of explanation provide different sorts of causes.5 The most straightforward cause, and, indeed, ultimately the focus of the entire framework of causal explanation, is an essential or formal cause. An explanation that proceeds by formal cause provides a definition of the species or statement of its nature.

It is this definition that is the middle term. So, ideally, if we know what this species is, we can know why individual members of this species have the particular accidental attributes. definition of kn QR Code for VS .NET owledge only in the loose sense that it tells us something of the whatness of knowledge (a type of cognition) and the object of knowledge, namely, the cause of that which cannot be otherwise. It is not a proper definition of knowledge because knowledge of the cause and of the fact that it cannot be otherwise is, quite obviously, not the differentia of knowledge.

Thus, it tells us nothing to say knowledge of p is having a demonstration of it . For Aristotle s fourfold schema of causal explanation see Phys. 2.

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